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NOTES

SEARS AND COMPCO
STRIKE AGAIN
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.1
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to

Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." '2 Pursuant to this power, Congress has enacted statutes regulating the issuance of patents3 and copyrights. 4 State common and statutory
law have often clashed with federal laws in these areas. It is beyond dispute
that Federal law controls when such a clash occurs.5 Courts faced with a
potential conflict often look to the policies behind the federal laws to
6
determine whether the two laws can co-exist.
These policy considerations played an important role in the Supreme
Court's decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,7 in
which the parties asked the Court whether Florida's "plug-molding" statute
was constitutional.8 This statute prohibited the use of a particular method

1. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 971 (1989).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-294 (1982).
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-205 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 978 ("State regulation of intellectual
property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress
in our patent laws."); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81
(1974); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569 (1973); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
6. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979);
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480-82; Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561; Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964); Sears, 376 U.S. at 230-31.
7. Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 981-83.
8. Id. at 974. Florida's "plug-molding" statute provides: "It is unlawful
for any person to use the direct molding process to duplicate for the purpose of
sale any manufactured vessel hull or component part of a vessel made by another
without the written permission of that other person." FLA. STAT. § 559.94(2) (1987).
Other states that have enacted direct-molding statutes include: California, CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 17300, 17301 (West 1987); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4-8-
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of duplication known as the "direct molding process." 9 Further, the statute
granted both injunctive relief and damages to the manufacturer whose vessel
had been "unlawfully" copied.' 0 The prohibition was not constrained by
quality, originality, or time limitations, but rather unconditionally protected
all "vessel hull[s] or component part[s] of ... vessel[s]" from duplication

by the "direct molding process.""
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held the Florida statute
conflicted with federal patent law and was, therefore, invalid under the
supremacy clause.! 2 Specifically, the Court held the statute conflicted with
the policies underlying federal patent law: to encourage free enterprise and
to encourage invention. 3 In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the
plug-molding statute differed from traditional state statutes governing unfair
competition and trade secrets which have been held in most instances to
be constitutional, in that the policies behind the plug-molding statutes
worked against, rather than with the relevant federal policies. 4 The unfair
competition and trade secret statutes, on the other hand, served to further
the same policies promoted by the federal laws.' Additionally, the Court
clarified the scope of prior case law which had addressed the preemption
6
doctrines of intellectual property.'
The issue addressed by the Court and discussed in this Note is: Accepting
the premise that the states may not forbid copying something that Congress
has determined to be in the public domain, then may a state simply forbid
a particular method of copying? To answer this question, this Note will
consider first the history of federal preemption in the field of intellectual
property. The Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. '7 and Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 8 cases will serve as a starting point for this

1 (Burns 1989); Louisiana,
MD. CoM. LAw CODE

LA.

Rav.

STAT.

ANN. § 51:462 (West 1987); Maryland,

§ 11-1001 (1988); Michigan, MicH. CoM'.

LAWS ANN.

§

445.621-.624 (West 1989); Missouri, Mo. REv. STAT. § 306.900 (1986); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75A-28 (1985); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4750-111 (1988). The California, Michigan and Tennessee statutes prohibit the use
of the direct-molding process to copy any manufactured item.
9. The "direct molding process" is described by the Florida statute as "any

direct molding processing which the original manufactured vessel hull or component
part of a vessel is itself used as a plug for the making of the mold, which mold

is then used to manufacture a duplicate item." FLA.
10. FLA. STAT. § 559.94(4) (1987).
11. FLA. STAT. § 559.94(2) (1987).
12. Bonito Boats, 109 S.Ct. at 986.
13. Id. at 981.
14. Id. at 982.

STAT.

§ 559.94(l)(a) (1987).

15. Id. at 984-85.
16. See infra notes 18-101 and accompanying text for discussion of the
history of federal pre-emption in the field of intellectual property.
17. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
18. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Although Sears and Compco involved consideration
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/7
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discussion. In these two landmark cases, the Court held that certain state
unfair competition laws which governed intellectual property were preempted
by federal law. The history of federal preemption will include an analysis
of several cases in which other state laws regulating intellectual property
were challenged under the Sears and Compco doctrine. The Note will
proceed, then, to consider cases decided prior to Bonito Boats where the
enforceability of the plug-molding statutes was at issue. Next, the Court's

decision in Bonito Boats will be discussed and analyzed. The analysis will
focus on comparing and contrasting the plug-molding statutes with other
state laws that regulated intellectual property and that courts have held to
be constitutional.

TiiE

SEARts AND CoMco CASES

Among the more significant cases to find that federal law preempted
a state law are Sears and Compco. These cases established the principle
that the state may not prohibit one from copying something that the federal
government has left in the public domain, freely copyable by all. The issue
in both Sears and Compco was "whether a State's unfair competition law
can, consistently with the federal patent laws, impose liability for or prohibit
the copying of an article which is protected by neither a federal patent
nor a copyright." 19 Illinois' unfair competition law, the law challenged in
both cases, -provided protection to the initial manufacturer when there was
a "likelihood of confusion as to the source of the products. ' 20 The law
did not require that one manufacturer had attempted to "palm off" his
goods as those of another. 2' This distinction is significant because it meant

of state unfair competition laws, language in the cases lead many courts to consider
their applicability to other areas of state and federal law regulating intellectual
property. As this Note discusses, much of the effect of Sears and Compco has
dissipated over time and, in Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court condoned this
dissipation. Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 979-80.
19. Sears, 376 U.S. at 225.
20. The Court in Sears and Compco addressed the situation where a state
prevented copying of an item. The Court found the state could, consistent with
federal law, "require that goods ... be labeled or that other precautionary steps
be taken to prevent customers from being misled as to the source." Id. at 232
(emphasis added); see also Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
21. Sears, 376 U.S. at 227. But see id. at 227 n.2. "Palming off" occurs
when one intentionally suggests her product is that of another manufacturer. William
R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531 (1924); American Washboard
Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1900). One is not guilty
of palming off when, as in Sears and Compco, one manufactures a product virtually
identical to another's, yet clearly designates the product as her own and does not
indicate it is produced by another manufacturer. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
Emenee Indus., 16 A.D.2d 420, 421-22, 228 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515-16 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
12 N.Y.2d 826, 236 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1962); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON &
D. OwEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON run LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984) § 130, at
1016.
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that, under the Illinois law, a manufacturer was more likely to have a
cause of action for unfair competition than in most states, which did require
"palming off." Under Illinois law the state could prevent the manufacturer
from copying the item, even if the goods' source was clearly indicated, as
in Sears and Compco.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,22 Stiffel had obtained design
and mechanical patents on a "pole lamp"-a lamp made with a vertical
tube and fixtures along the outside. Subsequently, Sears sold, at a substantially lower price, a "pole lamp" virtually identical to one produced
by Stiffel.?3 Stiffel brought suit claiming, first, that Sears had infringed
Stiffel's patents and, second, that by selling the pole lamps, Sears had
created confusion about the source of the lamps and thus had engaged in
unfair competition under Illinois law.24 The district court invalidated Stiffel's
patents for want of invention, but held that the two lamps were virtually
identical and "that confusion between them is likely, and some confusion
has already occurred." On that basis, the district court enjoined Sears
from selling pole lamps "identical to or confusingly similar to Stiffel's
lamps." 26 The court of appeals affirmed. 27
The United States Supreme Court, on certiorari, held that Illinois'
unfair competition law was incompatible with federal patent law and, thus,

unconstitutional.Y The Court noted that the federal patent system was
carefully designed to encourage inventiveness by rewarding worthy inventions
with a federal patent and leaving for public use those inventions that do
not meet the system's strict criteria. 29 The Court stated that a state law
frustrated these goals when it "prevent[ed] the copying of an article which
represents too slight an advance to be patented .
"...
-3 To allow such a
practice, in the guise of unfair competition, "would be to permit the State
to block off from the public something which federal law has said belongs
to the public."'" The Court conceded "a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled
or that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being

22. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
23. Id.at 225-26.
24. Id.at 226.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963),
rev'd, 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
28. Id. at 227-28.

29. Id. at 229-32.
30. Id. at 231-32.

31.

Id. at 232. This statement stems from the premise that monopolies hinder

free enterprise and, by granting a patent, the federal government essentially creates

a monopoly in something which would have otherwise been in the public domain.
See Bonito Boats, 109 S.Ct. at 975-76.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/7
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misled as to the source." '3 2 Nonetheless, "a state may not, when the article
is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself
' 33
or award damages for such copying.
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 4 a companion case, considered the same unfair competition law. Day-Brite, a manufacturer of

fluorescent light fixtures, had secured a design patent on a reflector used
in the fixtures when Compco, another fluorescent light fixture manufacturer,
began producing fixtures with a reflector virtually identical to Day-Brite's.

Day-Brite sued Compco for patent infringement and unfair competition.35
The district court invalidated Day-Brite's patent, but granted relief under
Illinois' unfair competition law. 3 6 The Supreme Court reversed and held

that it was impermissible to forbid Compco's copying of the Day-Brite
fixture.37 The Court also stated that evidence of "secondary meaning,"

38

the non-functionality of design, 3 9 or consumer confusion, while relevant to
a state's decision to require labeling, could not provide a basis to prevent
copying.4 The impact of the Sears and Compco holdings, particularly the

32. Id.
33. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232-33.
34. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
35. Id. at 234-35.
36. Id. at 235.
37. Id. at 237-38.
38. Secondary meaning is a term commonly used in the areas of trademark
and unfair competition law. Four types of words are available to designate a
product: generic, descriptive, suggestive and arbitrary. Transgo, Inc. v. AJAC
Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474
U.S. 1059 (1986). Arbitrary and suggestive terms are immediately registerable as
trademarks. Generic terms are never registerable. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park
and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985), on remand, 782 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1986).
Descriptive terms are only registerable as trademarks if they have acquired a
secondary meaning. Id.; Transgo, 768 F.2d at 1015. Secondary meaning is also
required when an aspect of the product itself is to serve as a trademark, In re
Morton-Norvich Prod., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 (C.C.P.A. 1982), unless it is
inherently distinctive. Id. This means the term or product feature is no longer
viewed by the public as descriptive of the type of product, but rather indicates a
particular source of the product. Truck Equip. Ser. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536
F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). Or, in other words,
once a "phrase has acquired its new meaning, its so-called secondary meaning has

become its primary, or natural meaning." Charcoal Steak House of Charlotte, Inc.
v. Staley, 263 N.C. 199, 202, 139 S.E.2d 185, 187 (1964). See generally Lunsford,
The Mechanics of Proof of Secondary Meaning, 60 TRADEMARK REP. 263 (1970).
39. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985). A feature
is functional "if without it other producers of the product could not compete
effectively." It is non-functional if it is "merely [an] incidental feature which gives
the [product] some individual distinction but which producers of competing [products] can readily do without." Id. at 346.
40. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238. This language created a fervor in the legal
community because, taken literally, it conflicted with an area of trademark law.
Previously, if one demonstrated that a product design or feature was non-functional

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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Neverabove statement, 41 is less substantial than originally anticipatedz.
theless, the cases often serve as a starting point for questions about the
validity of state laws that regulate intellectual property. Sears, Compco,
and subsequent decisions interpreting them establish that it is important
to consider the purposes of the state statutes regulating intellectual property;
if the state's purposes conflict with the federal patent goals, the state laws
will be invalid under the supremacy clause. States can regulate only if the
goals of the state and federal laws are harmonious.43

SEARS AND ComPco APPLiED

1.

Trade Secret Laws

Soon after Sears and Compco were handed down, suits were brought
to challenge the constitutionality of trade secret laws under the doctrine
established by Sears and Compco.44 State laws had traditionally governed

and that it had acquired secondary meaning, she could register it as a trademark.
See supra note 38. Courts could construe Compco to prevent registration of this
type of trademark since the effect of a trademark is to allow the holder of the
mark to have exclusive use thereof.
Consequently, courts were quick to address this potential application of Sears
and Compco. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964),
decided without considering Sears and Compco, held that an object's protection
by a design patent does not preclude its registration as a trademark. Id. at 930.
Subsequent cases applied Mogen David in light of Sears and Compco and held
that trademark protection was still viable for non-functional features that had
acquired secondary meaning. Therefore, courts could forbid copying of such features.
See In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080
(1974); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
41. See supra note 40.
42. See 3 R. CALLMAN, UNFAM COMPETITION, TRADEMARKs AND MONOPOLIES
§ 19.36 (4th ed. 1981); 1 D. CinSUM, PATENTS § 1.0416] (1989).
43. Some had argued that Congress' power over intellectual property was
exclusive and, thus, the states could not regulate in this field at all. See Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973). On at least two, occasions, the Court determined that federal power
was not exclusive and that states may regulate provided the state law does not
" 'stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.' i " Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 479 (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 551-58.
44. See, e.g., Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971);
Dekar Indus. v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 945 (1971); Water Serv., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th
Cir. 1969); Servo Corp. of Am. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.
1964), reh'g denied, 342 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934, reh'g
denied, 384 U.S. 914 (1966). See generally Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of
Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 17 (1971).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/7
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this area of law, and state trade secret laws had been in effect long before
the court decided Sears and Compco.45 Because some trade secrets potentially
are patentable, there is a possibility of conflict with federal patent law.
The United States Supreme Court considered the effect of this potential
conflict in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,4 when it addressed the
constitutionality of Ohio's trade secret laws. This case was one of many
that chipped away at the Sears and Compco cases and made it apparent
that courts should not read the two cases to preclude all state regulation
of intellectual property, even if that regulation provided that a party in
error could be prevented from copying a product. In addition, Kewanee
taught that the more significant consideration is whether the state trade
secret law conflicts in purpose, rather than in subject matter, with federal
patent law.47
Kewanee Oil manufactured crystals for use in ionization detection.
Bicron, a company organized largely from former employees of Kewanee
Oil, began to produce the same crystals soon after its formation.4 8 Kewanee
Oil sued for misappropriation of trade secrets under Ohio's trade secret
law. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that federal patent laws
preempted Ohio's trade secret law. 49 The Supreme Court reversed. 0
Initially, the Court noted that Congress' power to regulate intellectual
property was not exclusive. 5 ' Thus, the states could, by appropriate legislation, regulate discoveries5 2 so long as such laws did "not conflict with
the operation of the laws ... passed by Congress." 53 The test to determine
whether a state law conflicts with federal law "involves a consideration
of whether that law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
' 54
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. '
Applying this test, the Court evaluated and compared the purposes of
the two putatively conflicting laws. One objective of federal patent law is
to promote discoveries and "to insure adequate and full disclosure" of
'
those discoveries.15 To accomplish this, Congress pays the "high price

of a seventeen-year monopoly

57

56

to the worthy inventor. Another objective

45. See Milgrim, supra note 44.
46. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). See Goldstein, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.:
Notes on a Closing Circle, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 81 for a discussion of the impact
of Kewanee on the Sears and Compco holdings.
47. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 493.
48. Id. at 473.
49. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973).
50. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 474.
51. Id. at 478-79; see also supra note 43.
52. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 479.
53. Id.
54. Id.(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
55. Id.at 480.
56. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481.
57. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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is to keep those inventions in the public domain that Congress has determined belong there.5 The Court found that the policies behind trade
secret protection are (1) to encourage good faith and fair dealing within
the commercial world and (2) to protect discoveries from misappropriation
by unfair means even though the discoveries are not patentable. 9
The Court found that to evaluate adequately the conflicts between the
two laws, the potential for conflict must be determined independently for
each type of subject matter governed by trade secret laws. The Court noted
there are essentially two categories of trade secrets: those that could never
be patentable and those that have some degree of potential for patentability.6 After having thus categorized the trade secrets, the Court continued
its analysis by first determining whether each category of trade secrets was
similar in subject matter to patentable items. If the court found the subject
matters were similar, it went on to determine whether the policies were
sufficiently similar so that the trade secret laws would be constitutional . 6
The Court found that Congress has left unattended those subjects not
governed by patent law and there is no reason "why the State[s] should
not be free to act. ' 62 These subjects include items related to the business
aspect of an organization, such as a customer list. The Court found that
providing protection for business practices would not discourage disclosure
of new ideas, which is a goal of patent law. It noted, "keeping such items
secret encourages businesses to initiate new and individualized plans of
operation, [and results in] constructive competition. ' 63
The Court further divided the second category, potentially patentable
items, into three subcategories: "(1) the trade secret believed by its owner
to constitute a validly patentable invention; (2) the trade secret known to
its owner not to be so patentable; and (3) the trade secret whose valid
patentability is considered dubious." 64 Each of these categories poses special
problems and, thus, requires individual attention.
The Court noted there would be little or no reason to deny state
protection for items the inventor believes will not meet the standards of
patentability. The Court found that such protection would "have a decidedly
beneficial effect on society," 65 because trade secret laws would be able to
provide the encouragement for invention normally provided by patent laws.
Were trade secret laws abolished and patent protection uncertain, manu-

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
(2nd Cir.
65.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
1971)).
Id. at

481-82.
482-83.
483-91.
483 (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973)).
484 (quoting Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224
485.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/7

8

Althauser: Althauser: Sears and Compco Strike Again

19891

SEARS AND COMPCO STRIKE AGAIN

1065

facturers would be forced to rely on increased salaries and security to
ensure employee loyalty. 6 Another factor the Court found persuasive was
that if an item is protected as a trade secret, the state could license its
use, thus, encouraging disclosure. Conversely, if trade secret protection
were unavailable, "[t]he result would be to hoard rather than disseminate
knowledge." 67 Overall, the Court found that the trade secret laws in this
area do not run afoul of federal policy; instead they help to promote
"discovery and exploitation of ... invention[s]. 68
Furthermore, the Court ruled that trade secret laws protecting inventions

of dubious patentability do not conflict with federal patent policy. 9 Invalid

patents are considered harmfuF0 because they grant unworthy items broad
federal protection. Trade secret laws alleviate this harm by offering alternate
protection. The Court found that if trade secret laws were abolished more
inventors would seek patent protection for subjects the inventor believed
were unpatentable. 71 This would increase the risk of invalid patents. With
the protection of the state laws, an inventor may rely on the sure, although
72
more limited, protection of trade secrets rather than seek patent protection.
The final category, inventions known to be patentable, are most similar
in subject matter to patentable items, thus, the policies of trade secret
laws must be correlated most closely to those of the federal patent system
in order to avoid an unconstitutional conflict. The Court found, however,
there was "no reasonable risk of deterrence from patent application by
those who can reasonably expect to be granted patents. ' 73 In reaching this
decision, the Court noted that patent protection is much more extensive
than trade secret law protection. Thus, although "trade secret law does
not produce any positive effects in the area of clearly patentable inventions," 74 neither does it discourage anyone from seeking patent protection.
When trade secret laws alone protect a product, anyone so inclined may
freely use reverse engineering. Patent laws do not, for a limited time, allow
this practice. 7s It is unlikely that an invention unprotected by patent would
remain secret for the period of time it would be uncopyable if patented.
The Court concluded that "the extension of trade secret protection to

66. Id. at 485-86.
67. Id.at 486.
68. Id. at 485.
69. Id.at 487.
70. The Court noted an historical aversion to invalid patents and stated that
an invalid patent presents a serious threat "to the free use of ideas already in the
public domain." Id. at 488-89.
71. Id.at 488.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 489.
74. Id. at 491.
75. Id.at 489-91.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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clearly patentable inventions does not conflict with the patent policy of
disclosure.' '76
In addition to the policy considerations, the Court's decision was
influenced by the fact that "[t]rade secret law and patent law have coexisted
.. for over one hundred years;" 77 in that time, Congress has done nothing
to change the relationship between the two. The long history of trade secret
laws and the lack of conflict with federal patent policies clearly outweighed
any indication, found in Sears and7 Compco, that trade secret laws were
in conflict with federal patent law.
The analysis provided in Kewanee Oil is helpful in that it illustrates
the Court's method of comparing and contrasting various policies. Trade
secret laws, the Court believed, actually further, or at least do not deter,
the goals of the federal patent system. Thus, Kewanee Oil established that
state and federal laws protecting essentially the same subjects can coexist. 79
Additionally, the analysis in Kewanee Oil will be helpful in understanding
Bonito Boats because the plug-molding statutes, like the trade secret laws,
offer protection to objects within the scope of potential federal patent
protection. The policies behind the plug-molding statutes, however, work
against, rather than with, the relevant federal policies.
2. Other State Laws Regulating Intellectual Property
Another Supreme Court case in the history of federal preemption of
state intellectual property laws is Goldstein v. California.80 Although rendered moot by the phono record provisions of the 1971 amendment and
the 1976 Copyright Revision Act, 8' it provides additional insight into the
methods of analysis used by the Court to determine whether a state law,
due to a conflict in policies, must defer to the interests of a federal system.
In Goldstein, the defendant was charged with violating a section of
the California Penal Code that prohibited copying sound recordings that
were intended to be sold. 82 At the time the copies at issue in Goldstein

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 491.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id. at 493.

80. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).

81. The current act includes sound recordings as a subject matter of copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
82. Id. at 548. The California statute provided in part:
(a) every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who:
(1) Knowingly and willfully transfers or causes to be transferred any sounds
recorded on a phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article
on which sounds are recorded, with intent to sell or cause to be sold,
... such article on which such sounds are so transferred, without the

consent of the owner.
CAL. PENAM CODE § 653h (West 1970).
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were made, there was no federal copyright protection for sound recordings. 3
Even though the California statute "effectively prohibit[ed] the copying of
works ... not entitled to federal protection, ' 8 4 the Court found it did
not conflict with federal policy and was, therefore, not void under the
supremacy clause of the Constitution. 5
Initially, the Court addressed the legitimacy of state action in the area
of copyright protection and found that the power to grant copyrights was
not vested exclusively in the federal government. 86 It went on to conclude
that state copyright protection would not "prejudice the interests of other
States, '8 7 because "a copyright granted by a particular State has effect
only within its boundaries." 8 While this may lessen the value of a state
copyright, because not all states would protect the works, a conflict in
states' laws of this type would not unduly prejudice the states not offering
the protection. 9 The Court held that within the state's boundaries, the
copyright laws of that state serve the same purpose as federal copyright
laws: "to induce new artistic creations." 9 Finally, the Court found that
the unlimited duration of the protection offered by the California statute
was not a bar to its constitutionality 9' because the Article I, Section 8
limitation applies only to federal action. 92
After determining that copyright protection by states generally was
permissible, the Court considered whether California's statute was void
under the supremacy clause. In so doing, the Court used the familiar
standard: Does the state law stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress?" 93 The
primary argument against the statute's constitutionality was that Congress,
by not expressly granting copyright protection to sound recordings, had

intentionally left them in the public domain. 94 The Court found, however,
83. Id.at 549-52.
84. Id. at 551.
85. Id.at 570.
86. Id.at 558.

87. Id. It is relevant that the protection offered in Goldstein was against

record piracy and did not grant complete copyright protection. Id. at 550-51.

88. Id. This was relevant in that California's law did not impose a burden
on other states to regulate in a like manner and citizens of those states could freely
copy what was protected in California. Id. Still, the Court had to consider whether
the mere difference in protection offered by various states was prejudicial.

89. Id.at 558-59.
90. Id.at 559.
91. Id. at 561.
92. Id. at 560-61.
93. Id. at 561 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
94. Id. at 563. The petitioner first argued Congress had affirmatively omitted
sound recordings from the Copyright Act of 1909. However, the Court noted that
it must consider this deletion in light of the technology available at the time the
Act was written. Considering the differences between 1909 and current technology,
the Court found that the sound recordings at issue in Goldstein were not of a
type considered by Congress in 1909. Id. at 563-66.
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that although Congress had explicitly offered copyright protection for certain
"writings," sound recordings not included, it had not indicated an intent
to prohibit state control of "records, as renderings of original artistic
performance." 95
Finally, the Court addressed the impact of Sears and Compco on its
decision, finding that those decisions did not preclude the result reached
in Goldstein. While Congress has created a careful balance in the patent
system which cannot be disturbed by state action, "in the case of recordings
of musical performances ... Congress has drawn no balance, rather, it
has left the area unattended, and no reason exists why the State should
96
not be free to act."
So, with Goldstein, the Court illustrated that, at least in the copyright
field, state and federal protection can coexist. Once again, the similarity
of the respective policies was an important consideration. In Goldstein,
yet another state law, almost certainly unconstitutional according to the
exact language of Sears and Compco, 97 was upheld. It was becoming clear
that Sears and Compco did not restrict state law to the extent once believed.
3.

State Unfair Competition Laws

One can see further limitation on the Sears and Compco holdings in
the lower courts' treatment of state unfair competition laws. Courts often
have ignored the dicta in Compco,9 which purported to prohibit state
protection of items, via unfair competition laws, even if secondary meaning
and non-functionality had been established.? Although there are exceptions,00 it may generally be said that states can, via unfair competition

95. Id. at 566.
96. Id. at 569-70.
97. Although the Goldstein Court considered Sears and Compco, it did not
address the words found in the holding of Sears that "a State may not, when the
article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself
...... Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) (emphasis
added). The dissent, however, did address that language and found that, as the
statute forbade others from copying an article unprotected by copyright, it was
invalid under the supremacy clause. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 573-74; see also Brown,

Publication and Preemption in Copyright Law: Elegiac Reflections on Goldstein
v. California, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1022 (1975).
98. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
99. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964);
Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 910, 915 (S.D. Tex.
1976) (The court found, first, that Sears and Compco do not forbid common law
trademark protection and, second, that the cases do not bar recovery for unfair
competition in trademark cases. The plaintiff had established secondary meaning
so the court granted relief.).
100. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1449 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
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laws, prevent one from copying the non-functional features of an item
which have acquired secondary meaning. A state may not, however, prevent
one from copying a functional feature of an item.10'
TBE PLUG-MOLDING STATUTES

1.

Background

Plug-molding statutes often protect functional features from being copied by the direct molding process. Cases in which courts have used the
statutes as a basis for granting injunctions or awarding damages illustrate
the potential impact of their continued use. In Brahma, Inc. v. Joe Yeargain,
Inc.,102 the court found itself faced with the task of interpreting California's
plug-molding statute. The defendant had used the original product as a
mold for only a portion of the new product. The court looked to the
intent of the legislature and determined, "Itihe clear intent of the law is
to prohibit what the legislature considered to be an unfair trade practice."'0 3
The court then concluded that, when faced with the question whether a
defendant has violated the statute, one should inquire "whether by using
a competitor's product as a 'plug' or pattern in making a mold which in
turn is used to manufacture the same product," the subsequent manufacturer
"obtained an unfair competitive advantage by avoiding otherwise necessary

development costs."''

4

In Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc. ,I°S the court found the
defendant had violated New York's unfair competition statute and the
plug-molding statutes of California, Michigan and Tennessee. Based on
this determination, the Court enjoined the defendant from importing a
juicer.'0 6 In this case, the court found no evidence of secondary meaning
in the product design.107
The over-broad reading in Brahma and the extensive injunction granted
in Metro Kane Imports serve as examples of the potential economic harm
of these statutes. Although the original opinion in Metro Kane Imports
limited the injunction to sales in the three states whose statutes had been

101. Sunbeam Corp. v. Equity Indus., 635 F. Supp. 625, 638 (E.D. Va.
1986).
102. 665 F. Supp. 1447 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
103. Id. at 1452.
104. Id. (emphasis omitted).
105. 618 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
106. Id. at 276-77.
107. Id. at 276. This case received unfavorable review, as did plug-molding
statutes generally in Heald, Unfair Competition and Federal Law: Constitutional
Restraints on the Scope of State Law, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1411, 1416-17 (1987).
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violated, 08 the subsequent injunction was not so limited.' 9 In Brahma, the
court gave California's statute considerable effect, going beyond the words
of the statute to the perceived policy behind it.
The court in Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc. dealt with the
plug-molding statute in a different manner. n0 In this case, the court held
that Power Control's product, the subject of a design patent, was functional;
therefore, the patent was invalid."' The plaintiff also sought protection
under California's plug-molding statute. The court denied relief on the
ground that "an action for unfair competition cannot be based upon a
functional design." It reasoned "[t]here is no reason to think that the
California courts would apply a different principle in interpreting their
statute."" 2 Here, the court went in the opposite direction from the Brahma
court, giving the statute a narrow reading to prevent what it believed would
be an unconstitutional result.'
The United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
these statutes in Bonito Boats. Recognizing that plug-molding statutes largely
serve to protect functional features, the court considered whether the state
could constitutionally prohibit a form of copying, the direct molding process,
which is, apparently, the most economical method of copying in many
circumstances. 14
2. The Holding of the Supreme Court
Bonito Boats, after a substantial engineering and manufacturing effort,
developed a hull design for a fiberglass recreational boat which the company
placed on the market in September of 1976.'" In May of 1983, after the
boat had been on the market for six years, the Florida legislature enacted

108. Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 702, 707-08
(1984) (previous decision denying Metro Kane Imports' motion for preliminary
injunction). The court held that the injunction would be granted if irreparable
harm were shown. Id.

109. Metro Kane Imports, 618 F. Supp. at 277. It is jnteresting to note that
in the first Metro Kane Imports case, the court held that federal law preempted
New York's unfair competition statute because the New York statute did not require
secondary meaning. In neither case did the court consider the potential preemption
of the plug-molding statutes.
110. Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234 (Fed. Cir.

1986).
111. Id. at 240. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982) allows the issuance of a design patent
for "any new, original and ornamental design." Functional products are not
included.
112. Power Controls Corp., 806 F.2d at 240 (citing J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAiR CompETrioN

§ 7.26 (2d ed. 1984)).

113. Id.
114.

Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

115. Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 974.
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its plug-molding statute.11 6 Subsequently, Bonito Boats, a Florida corporation, brought suit against Thunder Craft, a Tennessee corporation, for

violation of the Florida statute and sought a temporary and permanent
injunction to prevent Thunder Craft from "continuing to unlawfully duplicate and sell Bonito Boat hulls or components. ' 1 7 The Florida courts
concluded that the statute "impermissibly interfered with the scheme established by the federal patent laws.""
The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion, concluded that the Florida
court had been correct in its interpretation of the application of the Sears
and Compco doctrine to the plug-molding statute." 9 Initially, the Court
gave a lengthy dissertation on the history of patent law and the policies
embodied therein. The constitutional provision for Congressional authority
in the area and the laws which Congress has enacted pursuant to that
power were created to "balance ...

the need to promote innovation and

the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both
necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive
economy."' 20 Inherent in this balance is the belief that once an object has
been placed in the public domain it cannot be subsequently removed. This
consideration was especially important in Bonito Boats where the boat had
been on the market for six years prior to the statute's enactment and the
resulting court action.' 2' The Court further stated that the "balance" should
be maintained so that "free exploitation of ideas is the rule, to which the
protection of a federal patent is the exception."'2
Thus, only the inventor whose invention meets the strict standards of
patentability-novelty, usefulness and nonobviousness123-is rewarded with
federal patent protection. In return for the limited exclusive use of the
invention, the inventor must fully disclose her invention to the public,
making it available for future inventors. Consequently, a federal patent
will be issued only when it will encourage "the creation and disclosure of
new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design."' 2 4 The
Court concluded that "state regulation of intellectual property must yield

116. See supra note 8 for the text of the Florida statute.
117. Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 974.

118. Id. at 975. The lower court decisions are Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 515 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1987) and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 487 So. 2d 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
must not
prior art.

Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 986.
Id. at 975.
Id. at 974.
Id. at 978.
Id. at 977. For non-obviousness to exist an inventor of ordinary skill
think that an invention, for which a patent is sought, is obvious, given
Id.

124. Id.
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to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our
patent laws."'25
With this standard in mind, the Court considered the present impact
of Sears and Compco, noting they could have been "taken to stand for
the proposition that the States are completely disabled from offering any
form of protection to articles or processes which fall within the broad
scope of patentable subject matter."' 26 The Court admitted, however, such
a broad reading was "inappropriate."' 2 7 Instead, it indicated that for
guidance, one should look to the "heart" of Sears and Compco, namely:
"[tihe efficient operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian
The Court concluded that "the States may not offer patentconceptions.'
like protection to intellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law.' 1 29 Nevertheless, the Court recognized
that this does not forbid the states from preventing "copying of nonfunctional aspects of consumer products which have acquired secondary
meaning . "10 Nor does it inhibit the ability of states to protect trade
31
secrets.
The Court found that the Florida statute does not provide a permitted
type of protection. 3 2 First, the plug-molding statutes differ significantly
from traditional unfair competition laws. Those laws operate to protect
consumers from deception and confusion about the source of a product;
"the design 'idea' itself may be freely exploited in all other contexts."' 3
Conversely, plug-molding statutes, while putatively enacted to provide manufacturers with an incentive for invention, operate to prevent "the exploitation of the design and utilitarian conceptions embodied in the product
itself.' ' 34 Although the plug-molding statutes and the federal patent system
arguably further a similar goal-encouragement of invention-the Court
found that the plug-molding statutes operate to upset the balance maintained
by Congress by providing too much protection with standards of innovation
that are too low. 135 The state, by enacting the plug-molding statute, attempted to set the standards for patent-like protection. This role is reserved
for Congress and "[tihe States are simply not free in this regard to offer
equivalent protection to ideas which Congress has determined should belong

125. Id. at 978.

126. Id. at 979.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 980.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 981.
131. Id. at 979-80.
132. Id. at 981.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.at 982.
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to all."' 3 6 Additionally, the plug-molding statutes serve a purpose which
is significantly different from that of trade secret laws. The Court noted
"[t]he protections of state trade secret laws are most effective at the
137
developmental state ...when patentability [is] an uncertain prospect."'
The plug-molding statutes, however, provide the inventor, "from the outset
of his effort," with the assurance that the result will be protected, regardless
of its patentability. 38 Furthermore, it is unlikely an inventor would rely
139
on trade secret protection for an invention he believed was patentable.
Plug-molding statutes, however, "eliminate the most efficient method"
available for exploitation of an invention. 40 Thus, by providing substantial
protection with minimal standards, plug-molding statutes are a real threat
to the uniformity of the federal patent system due to the probability that
one would rely on the plug-molding statutes rather than seek a federal
4

patent.1 '

Finally the fact that the Florida statute prohibited only one method
of copying did not persuade the Court. Plug-molding, the Court believed,
is a form of reverse engineering, a practice the states have not attempted
to prevent through trade secret or unfair competition laws. 42 Reverse
engineering acts as an incentive to the inventor "to develop inventions
which meet the rigorous requirements of patentability. 1 1 43 Thus, although
it prohibits only one method of copying, the statute still hinders full
realization of federal patent law policy-encouragement of inventiveness.
The decision in Bonito Boats conflicted with the only other decision
in which the plug-molding statute's constitutionality had been addressed.
The federal circuit court, in InterpartCorp. v. Italia,'44 held that California's
plug-molding statute 45 was constitutional. 46 The plaintiff accused the defendant of using the direct molding process to duplicate automobile rear
view mirrors. 47 The district court had held that federal law preempted the
statute. The appellate court overturned that decision, finding comfort in
the fact that the statute "does not give the creator of the product the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the product as does

136. Id.at 985.

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.at 983.
Id.
See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 984.

141. Id.at 983.
142. Id.at 982.
143. Id.at 982.

144. Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
145. California's plug-molding statute provided, in part: "It shall be unlawful
for any person to duplicate for the purpose of sale any manufactured item made
by another without the permission of that other person using the direct molding
process .... ." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17300(a) (West 1987).
146.

Interpart Corp., 777 F.2d at 685.

147. Id.at 679-80.
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the patent law."' 148 The court felt the laudable goal of merely preventing
others from using the most economical method of copying a product,
otherwise in the public domain, did "not 'clash' with the federal patent
49

law."M

The Court in Bonito Boats found the arguments used in Interpart
unpersuasive. Interpart's finding that the statute was a mere regulation was

clearly erroneous because by precluding copying by the most efficient method

available, it effectively created property rights in the product. 150 Although
the Interpart court found that the statute prevented the use of an unfair
method of copying, the Court noted this is not a decision for that court
to make, rather it is a decision which has been left to Congress.",
The Court concluded that protection of the type offered by the Florida
statute conflicted with the federal patent policy. The statute overlapped an
area of the law for which nationwide uniformity is necessary. 5 2 Such an
infringement on the balance struck by Congress could not be permitted,
therefore, the Court held that the supremacy clause preempted Florida's
statute."'

3. Analysis of the Decision
It is difficult to determine whether the Court would have upheld the
plug-molding statutes had all courts followed the lesson of the Power
Controls court and interpreted them to apply only to non-functional features. It is unlikely it would have upheld them because there would still
be no requirement of secondary meaning, the existence of which is necessary
for states to offer protection. 5 4 Furthermore, it seems clear that the plugmolding statutes were not enacted to protect only non-functional features.
First of all, some, like the Florida statute, prohibited use of the direct
molding process only on vessel hulls or its component parts,' items which
are, at least in most instances, functional. Additionally, if a feature was
non-functional and had acquired secondary meaning, state unfair competition laws could be used to prevent its copying. 5 6 Thus, it is only in a
situation where a feature is functional or it has not acquired secondary
meaning that plug-molding statutes would add to the protection normally
granted by state and federal laws to intellectual property.

148. Id. at 684-85.
149. Id. at 685.
150. Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 984.

151. Id.at 985.
152. Id.at 983.
153.

Id. at 986.

154. Id. at 981.
155. FLA. STAT. § 559.94(2) (1988).

156. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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It is insightful to compare trade secret protection and the Court's
decision in Kewanee Oil to plug-molding statute protection and the decision
in Bonito Boats. First, the two laws by nature protect different types of
goods. Trade secret laws are most effective when protecting items in the
developmental state or those which are not easily duplicated by conventional
means. 117 Conversely, plug-molding statutes protect goods which, by their
nature, can easily be duplicated by the direct molding process. Additionally,
trade secret laws protect only those items which the manufacturer has kept
secret, whereas plug-molding statutes protect goods from being copied once
a manufacturer places them on the market.' 58 Thus, a manufacturer could
only protect the items governed by the plug-molding statutes from disclosure
by refusing to offer them for sale, an unprofitable option. Consequently,
it seems the goods protected by the plug-molding statutes would be offered
for sale and disclosed to the public even without the protection of the
statutes. 5 9 It appears the statutes were enacted to provide an economic
advantage to the first manufacturer. This is not, the Court noted, a decision
for state legislatures to make. 6°
Second, the policies behind the two laws are quite different. 16' While
trade secret laws serve much the same purpose as patent laws, namely to
encourage invention, the purpose of the plug-molding statutes is contrary

to the federal policy. The protection offered by trade secret laws is not

"patent like" for they merely prevent one from misappropriating, by unfair

means, the trade secrets of another. 62 Legitimate methods of discovery,
including reverse engineering, are not prohibited. Conversely, plug-molding
statutes prohibit the use of a method allowed by trade secret laws and
disallowed only by the federal patent laws. By using the plug-molding
method, a manufacturer may be able to avoid the initial research cost.
This does not make the method unfair, merely economical. A law which
has the primary purpose of providing an economic advantage to the initial
manufacturer of a product not worthy of patent protection clearly has no
place in a system of free enterprise where "free exploitation of ideas [is]
the rule to which the protection of a federal patent [or patent-like protection]
' 63
is the exception.'

157. See Eastern Marble Prod. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 372 Mass. 835,
838-39, 364 N.E.2d 799, 801 (1977).

158. For a discussion of the requirements necessary to keep an item secret,
see USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 379 Mass. 90, 393 N.E.2d 895 (1979),
appeal after remand, 392 Mass. 334, 467 N.E.2d 1271 (1984).

159. This assumption is illustrated by Bonito Boats where the manufacturer
offered its boats for sale six years prior to the enactment of the statute. Bonito
Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 974.
160. Id. at 982-83.
161. Id.at 983.
162. A patent would, of course, preclude copying by any means.

163. Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 978.
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Furthermore, it is interesting to compare Goldstein's approval of a
statute that prohibits copying sound recordings to Bonito Boats. Many of
the arguments successful in Goldstein failed in Bonito Boats. For example,
in Goldstein, one of the first things the Court noted was that "[a]lthough
the protection offered ...

is substantial, lasting for an unlimited time,

the scope of the proscribed activities is narrow."' 164 Whereas in Bonito
Boats, both the Florida courts and the Supreme Court found that, although
only one method of copying was prohibited, the statute still impermissibly
interfered with the federal patent system. 65 In addition, unlike the Bonito
Boats Court, the Goldstein Court was not concerned by the lack of time
constraints on the protection.
These differences can be explained. First of all, in Goldstein, the California statute sought to give copyright protection to something not mentioned
in the federal copyright laws while the Florida statute sought to give patentlike protection to something presumably unpatentable under federal law. The
federal patent laws focus more on criteria of patentability versus the copyright
laws which focus more on what types of works are protectable. The criteria
of patent laws can more easily be applied in the face of advancing technology.
In fact their goal is to advance technology. Copyright laws, on the other
hand, must be amended to incorporate new subjects worthy of copyright
protection or tQ prevent new methods of copying.' 66 In line with this discussion
is that Congress had decided, by the time Goldstein was handed down, to
offer copyright protection to sound recordings, while prior to Bonito Boats,
Congress had rejected attempts to lessen the standards for design patents.' 67
Finally, that the policies of the two statutes were different is an important
consideration. The statute in Goldstein was directed to essentially the same
goal as the federal copyright laws, while, as the Court found, the statute
in Bonito Boats worked against the federal patent policy.
As a final comparison, the unfair competition statutes which have been
upheld subsequent to Sears and Compco base their constitutionality on the
fact that they protect only goods or features which are non-functional and
have secondary meaning. Thus, the protection is far more trademark-like
than patent-like. Conversely, the plug-molding statutes, as discussed, serve
to protect features that are functional and have not acquired secondary
meaning.
One question which remains is whether those unfair competition laws
that require a showing of either "palming off"'' 6 or secondary meaning as
a precursor to recovery are constitutional. Under these laws, a state can

164. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 550 (1973).
165. Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 984.
166. For example, semiconductor chip products have recently been granted
copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 901-914 (Supp. 1984).
167. Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 986.
168. See supra note 21 for a discussion of "palming off."
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prevent one from copying an item without secondary meaning having been
established. 169 In Gemveto Jewelry Corp. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc.,170 the district
court found that New York's unfair competition law did not require evidence
of secondary meaning, provided it could be shown the competitor had engaged
in "palming off." After holding that Cooper had "palmed off" his goods
as those of Gemveto, the court granted an injunction.'17 The federal circuit
court of appeals vacated and remanded,' 72 finding that, since secondary
meaning had not been established, Cooper could not be prohibited from
copying Gemveto's products. It noted, however, an injunction could require

that Cooper adequately identify the source of the product.'73
The Supreme Court cited the federal circuit's Gemveto opinion with
approval in Bonito Boats.74 Thus, it seems the Court would not allow a
state to prevent copying based solely on a finding of "palming off." Requiring
that one discontinue "palming off" would seem to be clearly within the
scope of permitted state action.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it seems the Court's decision in Bonito Boats was sound.
Patent-like protection must be granted by the federal government or not at
all. Although it may seem unfair in some circumstances when one is able
to copy at a low price what another has produced at a high price, the
policies of the federal patent system and the need for uniformity must prevail.
The opinion was also helpful in that it codified the interpretation most
courts had given Sears and Compco. That is, states may prevent copying
of non-functional features that have acquired a secondary meaning but a
state may not prevent copying of functional features or those that have not
acquired secondary meaning.175
LUCINDA ALTHAUSER

169. Kazmaier v. Wooten, 761 F.2d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 1985); Gemveto Jewelry
Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1052, 1062 & n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated,
800 F.2d 256 (Fed. Cir. 1986), on remand, 694 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1988),
aff'd, 884 F.2d 1399 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Eaton Allen Corp. v. Paco Impressions
Corp., 405 F. Supp. 530, 533-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
170. 613 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
171. Id. at 1064.
172. Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 800 F.2d 256 (Fed. Cir.
1986), on remand, 964 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 884 F.2d 1399 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
173. Id. at 258-59.
174. Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 985.
175. Id.at 981.
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